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Marketing Motherhood:
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Assisted Reproductive Technology Agreements
Sarah Terman *
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

Each year thousands of young women enter the American gamete market as egg
providers. 1 They are actively recruited on college campuses and on the internet by
assisted reproductive technology clinics and are evaluated on the basis of their academic
achievements, athleticism, and appearance. 2 Egg providers are then individually
marketed to infertile intended parents, who may be looking for particular attributes. 3
Once a match is made, the provider will undergo hormone therapy designed to align her
ovulation cycle to that of the intended pregnancy carrier and cause her ovaries to go into
hyper-production. 4 When the time is right, several eggs will be extracted from the
woman’s ovaries, fertilized in vitro (usually with the intended father’s sperm), and
implanted in the womb of either the intended mother or a gestational carrier. 5 If the
procedure is successful and the resulting pregnancy is carried to term, a baby will be
born—a baby with strong genetic ties to an egg provider who has been paid to contract
away her claim to parenthood.
This article examines the rights and responsibilities of egg providers in assisted
reproductive technology (ART) arrangements. While much has been written on legal
disputes between intended parents and surrogates, 6 far less attention has been paid to the
role of egg providers in assisted reproductive arrangements. There may be a higher
degree of judicial involvement in disputes involving surrogates because surrogates run
*

Special thanks to Professor Helene Shapo for her guidance and support.
Unlike organ donors, who may not be paid for their gifts, egg donors are often motivated by generous
compensation packages, and are thus more accurately referred to as providers than donors. U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS (2003),
http://www.cdc.gov/art/art2003/PDF/ART2003.pdf [hereinafter ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
SUCCESS RATES]; Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte Donation,
2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 107, 108 n.5 (2001) (discussing the difference between donors and providers).
2
Jim Hopkins, Egg-donor Business Booms on Campuses, USA TODAY, Mar. 15, 2006, at A1; see generally
Kari L. Karsjens, Boutiques Egg Donations: A New Form of Racism and Patriarchy, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 57 (2002) (describing fertility clinic recruitment of egg donors).
3
See, e.g., Donors Wanted Classified Advertisements, STANFORD DAILY, http://daily.stanford.edu/
classified?category=Donors+Wanted.
4
AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, THIRD PARTY REPRODUCTION (SPERM, EGG, AND
EMBRYO DONATION AND SURROGACY): A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS 6,
http://www.asrm.org/Patients/patientbooklets/thirdparty.pdf.
5
Id. at 7.
6
E.g., Flavia Berys, Interpreting a Rent-A-Womb Contract: How California Courts Should Proceed When
Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements Go Sour, 42 CAL. W. L. REV. 321 (2006); H. Joseph Gitlin, Illinois:
An International Magnet for Surrogacy?, 94 ILL. B.J. 48 (2006); Krista Sirola, Are You My Mother?
Defending the Rights of Intended Parents in Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements in Pennsylvania, 14 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 131 (2006).
1
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the risk of becoming emotionally attached to the fetus during the nine-month gestation
period and are therefore more likely to seek parental status. Although cases involving
egg donors are less frequent, they are just as poignant and difficult to resolve.
Section One of this Comment describes the rising demand for alienable eggs and
analyzes the ways in which American courts have provided an incentive to ART clinics
to move away from traditional surrogacy arrangements toward arrangements involving
egg providers. Section Two focuses on the current state of federal and state regulation of
egg transfer and includes a discussion of the current bifurcated system of body part
alienability, in which eggs may be bought and sold, while organs may only be acquired
through gratuitous donation.
Following these two background sections, this Comment addresses three looming
questions in the area of egg provider fertility arrangements. First, do egg providers retain
any legal responsibilities for a genetic child born as a result of their donation? Second,
can egg providers ever sue for shared custody of their genetic children? And third, if egg
providers come to believe that their eggs have been misused, can they pursue contract
claims against intended parents and fertility clinics?
II. THE GROWING DEMAND FOR ALIENABLE EGGS

¶5

¶6

¶7

Third party fertility arrangements are, at the most basic level, designed to help an
individual or a couple achieve parenthood when they are lacking an essential component:
healthy sperm, a healthy womb, or healthy eggs. 7 First, a sperm provider may be sought
by heterosexual couples who are unable to conceive due to the male partner’s low sperm
count or by single women and lesbian couples who seek to achieve parenthood. 8 This
kind of artificial or alternative insemination with donor sperm has been performed
routinely since the 1940s and can be completed during a single doctor’s visit. 9
Second, a healthy womb may be needed if a woman is unable to carry a pregnancy
due to medical failing or if a homosexual male couple seeks to achieve parenthood.10 In
either situation, one of two basic arrangements can be made: a surrogate can be
inseminated directly with donor sperm or an intended father’s sperm, resulting in a child
that shares genetic consanguinity with the surrogate (known as a traditional surrogacy
arrangement), or a gestational carrier may be implanted with an existing embryo,
resulting in a child that is genetically unrelated to the woman who carries the pregnancy
(known as a gestational surrogacy arrangement). 11
Finally, healthy eggs may be needed when a woman’s own eggs are not viable due
to advanced age, medical defect, or when a homosexual male couple seeks to achieve
parenthood. In the latter case, one of the male partners’ sperm can be used to fertilize the
7

See generally AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 3 (summarizing
fertility clinic reports on the use of a variety of fertility treatments).
8
Id. at 9.
9
Id. at 9-11.
10
Id. at 13.
11
Id. at 3 (“Traditional surrogacy refers to a treatment in which a woman is inseminated with sperm for the
purpose of conceiving for an intended recipient. The surrogate has a genetic and biological link to the
pregnancy she might carry. In contrast, a gestational surrogate . . . is an individual in which embryos
created by the intended parents are transferred into the surrogate’s uterus, which has been prepared
hormonally to carry a pregnancy. The gestational surrogate has no genetic link to the fetus she is
carrying.”).
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donor eggs in vitro, resulting in an embryo that is genetically similar to one intended
parent, which may then be carried to term by a gestational surrogate.
¶8
Approximately seventy-seven percent of American fertility clinics now provide
services involving donor eggs. 12 Procedures involving donor eggs have grown in
popularity in recent years, partially because of legal developments that have made
traditional surrogacy arrangements less favorable. In traditional surrogacy arrangements,
an infertile couple pays a surrogate to first be inseminated with the male partner’s sperm
and then carry the pregnancy to term. Because the surrogate both contributes genetically
to the child and bears the pregnancy, traditional surrogacy arrangements result in children
having very close biological ties to their surrogates.
¶9
As one might expect, these types of ART arrangements are widely criticized, and
some courts have expressed their unwillingness to enforce surrogacy agreements. For
example, in the case of Matter of Baby M, a New Jersey couple entered into a surrogacy
arrangement with a woman who agreed to be artificially inseminated with the husband’s
sperm and carry the resulting embryo to term in exchange for $10,000. 13 After the baby
was born, the surrogate demanded that the baby be returned to her and threatened to
commit suicide if the couple did not comply. 14 The dispute eventually reached the New
Jersey Supreme Court, which held that the surrogacy contract was unenforceable. In so
holding, the court wrote: “While we recognize the depth of the yearning of infertile
couples to have their own children, we find the payment of money to a ‘surrogate’ mother
illegal, perhaps criminal, and potentially degrading to women.” 15
¶10
The holding was a major blow to traditional surrogacy, and in vitro fertilization
with donor eggs has emerged as a popular alternative. Instead of contracting with one
surrogate, ART clinics may alternatively contract with both an egg provider and a
gestational surrogate. Once donor eggs are extracted and fertilized in vitro, the embryo
can then be implanted into a gestational surrogate. By diffusing the maternal
contributions through the use of two women, one providing the eggs and one providing
the womb, neither of the women is easily viewed as the “natural mother” of the child, and
the holding in Baby M becomes less relevant. Thus, the holding in Baby M has added a
great deal of uncertainty to traditional surrogacy and has created a powerful incentive for
ART clinics to use donor eggs.
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
¶11

Egg transfer procedures and the larger market for alienable eggs remain largely
unregulated. While other industrialized nations like the United Kingdom, France, and
Canada have taken steps to outlaw the sale of gametes, 16 American legislatures have been
slow to respond to scientific advancements in the field of assisted reproductive
12

ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES, supra note 1, at 50.
537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988).
14
Id. at 1236-37.
15
Id. at 1234.
16
See David B. Resnik, Eggs for Sale, 3 J. MED. ETHICS 1 (2000), available at http://www.ecu.edu/csdhs/medhum/newsletter/v3n1.cfm (United Kingdom and France prohibit the sale of female reproductive
cells.); The Assisted Reproduction Act, 2004 S.C., ch. 2 (Can.), available at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/3/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/ government/C-6/C-6_3/C-6TOCE.html (Canadian
prohibition on the sale of human eggs).
13
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technology. This section examines three potential sources of egg transfer regulation: (1)
the National Organ Transplant Act, (2) regulations within the scientific community
governing the use of eggs in stem cell research, and (3) various state regulations.
¶12
In 1984, the U.S. Congress passed the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA),
which is perhaps the closest the federal government has ever come to regulating the
American market for eggs. 17 NOTA made it illegal to buy and sell certain body parts for
particular purposes, and provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly
acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use
in human transplantation.” 18 Violation of this provision calls for fines of up to $50,000
and up to five years imprisonment. 19 So, while a patient in need of a kidney transplant
may seek out a gratuitous donation from family members and friends, she may not offer
monetary compensation to potential donors. 20 Although NOTA effectively bans the sale
of human organs, it is consistently interpreted as insufficiently broad to cover the sale of
human gametes. 21
¶13
Some scholars argue that market inalienability imposed by NOTA ought to apply to
human gametes. 22 This would presumably result in a system in which infertile parents
would have to rely on gratuitous donations of eggs or sperm, just as patients with failing
livers and kidneys must now rely on gratuitous donations to meet their demand. This
extension, they argue, would not only be consistent with the language of the statute, but it
would also give greater effect to the purpose of the statute. 23 The legislative history of
NOTA lends some support to this claim. 24 For instance, then-Senator Al Gore
summarized the position of many legislators leading up to NOTA’s enactment, stating:
“It is against our system of values to buy and sell parts of human beings.” 25 The fact that
lawmakers referred to “organs” and “body parts” somewhat interchangeably illustrates
that they were perhaps generally concerned with protecting the human body, not just
organs, from commodification.
¶14
Conversely, supporters of the existing open market for human gametes argue that
alienability of human body products, including eggs and sperm, is well established in our
economy, and that Congress would have had to take a much greater and more explicit
step to end all body commodification. For example, the buying and selling of blood is
commonplace, and open markets for hair, teeth, and skin also exist. 26 Supporters of the
current commodification gap between organs and gametes also point to the level of
bodily invasion required for harvesting and transplantation. Gamete transfer is far less
17

National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 274-274e (2004).
Id. at § 274e.
19
Id. at § 274e(b) (stating penalties for violating prohibition on organ purchases).
20
See David E. Jefferies, The Body as Commodity: The Use of Markets to Cure the Organ Deficit, 5 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621, 624-27 (1998).
21
42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1) (narrowly defining “human organ” as “the human (including fetal) kidney, liver,
heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof and any other human
organ (or any subpart thereof, including that derived from a fetus)”).
22
See Andrew Wancata, No Value for a Pound of Flesh: Extending Market-Inalienability of the Human
Body, 18 J.L. & HEALTH 199, 200 (2003); Kari L. Karsjens, Boutique Egg Donations: A New Form of
Racism and Patriarchy, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 57, 89 (2002).
23
Wancata, supra note 22, at 214.
24
National Organ Transplant Act: Hearings on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the
Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 125, 128 (1983).
25
Id. (quoting Sen. Albert Gore, Jr.).
26
Jefferies, supra note 20, at 656.
18
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invasive and risk-prone than organ transfer. Sperm transfer has been done for centuries
and requires little or no medical intervention. 27 Egg transfer, while more invasive, rarely
involves the kind of risk and recovery time common to most organ transplant procedures.
Finally, a distinction can be drawn between gametes and other organs based on their
relative supply. Unlike the body parts listed in NOTA, sperm is regenerative, and, while
eggs do not regenerate, an average woman produces thousands during her lifetime. 28
Thus, physiological differences may support the disparate treatment of organs and
gametes under NOTA.
¶15
Although this paper focuses on reproductive technology arrangements, it is
interesting to note that the scientific community has also addressed the issue of egg
alienability for use in stem cell research. 29 Human embryonic stem cell research uses
cells extracted from human embryos. 30 The embryos themselves may be un-implanted
embryos created in ART procedures and then donated to research institutions, or they
may be embryos created for the sole purpose of stem cell extraction through in vitro
fertilization. 31 In either case, they rely on the use of human female eggs. The National
Academy of Sciences has issued guidelines for the collection of raw materials used in
human stem cell research that require informed consent and prohibit any payment to egg
donors beyond reimbursement of expenses incident to the donation. 32 While these
guidelines are purely hortatory, they illustrate a movement away from an open market for
eggs in the context of human embryonic stem cell research.
¶16
State legislatures have also approached the difficult task of regulating egg transfer
in a variety of ways and with varying results. Only two states address the alienability of
eggs directly: Louisiana explicitly prohibits the sale of “a human ovum, fertilized human
ovum, or human embryo,” 33 and Virginia explicitly sanctions the sale of human eggs. 34
Other state statutes do not mention eggs or gametes specifically, but effectively proscribe
their alienability by banning payment for all body parts, usually exempting hair and
blood. 35 In other states, statutory treatment of egg alienability is more ambiguous. For
example, the California Penal Code bans the transfer of “any human organ, for purposes
of transplantation, for valuable consideration,” but excludes from “human organ” plasma,
sperm, and any other renewable or regenerative tissue not otherwise specified. 36 Thus, it
27

See John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to Be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for
Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 374 n.2 (1991).
28
Katheleen R. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted Reproduction and the Transfer of Wealth,
31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 193, 239 (1997).
29
See Radhika Rao, Coercion, Commercialization, and Commodification: The Ethics of Compensation for
Egg Donors in Stem Cell Research, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1055, 1057 (2006).
30
Id. at 1055.
31
Id.
32
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL & INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., GUIDELINES FOR HUMAN
EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH 82-89 (2005).
33
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (West 2000).
34
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-291.16 (Lexis 2004) (exempting “ova” from the general ban on the sale of body
parts for any reason).
35
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-280a (2007); FLA. STAT. § 873.01 (2006); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/12-20 (West 2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-5-1 (West 2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.460 (2005); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4307 (Consol. 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.12(A) (West 2004); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 68-30-401 (2002); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 48.02(b) (Vernon 2003); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.345
(West 2004).
36
CAL. PENAL CODE § 367f (West 2000).
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is unclear whether the California statute applies to eggs, because, although eggs are not
organs, they also are not, technically speaking, regenerative.
¶17
The effect of these statutes on the market for alienable eggs is unclear. In
Louisiana, for example, the sale of eggs is prohibited, but young women are still recruited
by fertility clinics and offered compensation for the harvesting of their eggs. 37
Compensation packages in these cases are said to be for the woman’s “services,” not for
her eggs. 38 Thus, while state regulations differ, the availability of donor eggs is likely to
depend very little on varying state regulations and more on the varying demand for donor
eggs from state to state.
IV. RESPONSIBILITY TO THE RESULTING CHILD
¶18

Women who agree to enter third party fertility arrangements as egg providers are
routinely assured that their participation will end with the extraction of their eggs. 39
Although egg donors are rarely anonymous, given that the transfer procedure requires a
certain level of proximity between donor and recipient, their involvement in pregnancy or
child rearing is usually very limited. In fact, contractual arrangements between intended
parents and egg providers routinely require that intended parents absolve the egg donor of
any responsibility she might have to the resulting offspring following egg transfer. 40
Presumably, egg providers would be less likely to enter into these arrangements if they
perceived a risk of subsequent obligation to provide financial support for the child. It is
the position of this Comment, however, that contractual provisions absolving egg
providers of parental responsibilities are unenforceable.
¶19
Although American courts have yet to directly address this question, guidance may
be gathered from cases involving known sperm providers who agree to help intended
parents conceive so long as they absolve the sperm provider of any child support
obligations. These cases are significant in the context of egg donor ART arrangements
because they relate to the enforceability of contract provisions in which a known provider
agrees to donate a gamete on the condition that the intended parents assume all
responsibility for the child. In Kesler v. Weniger, for example, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania considered a mother’s action for child support against the biological father
of her son. 41 The parents had been involved in a sexual relationship for fifteen years prior
to the birth of their son, and the father did not contest his paternity. 42 Instead, he argued
that he and the child’s mother had agreed, before conception, that the mother would
assume all financial responsibility for the upbringing of the child. 43 Thus, the biological
father claimed that he was merely a sperm donor and would never have agreed to help
Kesler conceive but for her assumption of his parental responsibility. 44 Although the
37

E.g., A Woman’s Center for Reproductive Medicine, Donor Egg IVF Louisiana,
http://www.ivflouisiana.com/donor-egg.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
38
Id.
39
See e.g., Ova Donation Agreement (posted by intended mother), http://www.geocities.com/edinc0/.
40
K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 136, 140 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting egg donor contract), rev’d,
117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005).
41
744 A.2d 794 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
42
Id. at 795.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 795-96.
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court found that no such agreement between the parties existed, it stated that even if the
parties had agreed to such an arrangement, the father would retain responsibility for
support of the child. 45 The court reasoned that agreements by which intended parents
bargain away future claims for support are not binding because: “It matters not when an
agreement to forego support occurred; the right to support is a right of the child, not the
mother or father.” 46 Thus, the child’s right to support cannot be extinguished by parties
to fertility agreements at any time, even prior to the child’s conception. 47
¶20
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania applied the same reasoning four years later in
Ferguson v. McKiernan, which also involved a biological father’s challenge to a child
support order. 48 Again, the father argued that the support order was inappropriate
because the child’s mother had absolved him of all parenting obligations before
conception. 49 Unlike the father in Kesler, the father in Ferguson presented substantial
evidence that his contribution had been analogous to that of an anonymous sperm donor.
The child was conceived through in vitro fertilization, rather than through sexual
intercourse, and the mother had illustrated her intent to absolve the donor of financial
responsibility by listing her then-husband, rather than the sperm provider, on the baby’s
birth certificate. 50
¶21
The superior court found that the parties had, in fact, contracted to release the
sperm provider from any support obligations. 51 However, the court held that the contract
was unenforceable and affirmed the lower court’s order of support. Citing Kesler, the
superior court wrote, “a child’s right to support cannot be bargained away by either
parent, and any release or compromise is invalid to the extent it prejudices the child’s
welfare.” 52 The sperm donor successfully appealed, arguing that the Superior Court’s
support order unconstitutionally violated his equal protection rights by holding him
financially responsible for his genetic child, while sperm providers who donate in clinical
settings are not held similarly liable. 53 On December 27, 2007, just prior to publication
of this article, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the order of support. 54

45

Id. at 795.
Id. at 796.
47
Id. (“It cannot be bargained away before conception any more than it can be bargained away after birth,
nor can it be extinguished by principles of estoppel.”).
48
855 A.2d 121 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004), appeal granted in part, 868 A.2d 378 (Pa. Feb. 2, 2005).
49
Id. at 123.
50
Id. at 122.
51
Id. at 123. (The court wrote that the “agreement between the parties that appellant would donate his
sperm in exchange for being released from any obligation for any child conceived, on its face, constitutes a
valid contract.”).
52
Id.; Kesler v. Weniger, 744 A.2d 794, 795 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000); see also Sams v. Sams, 808 A.2d 206
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
53
Order Granting Appeal in Part, Ferguson v. McKiernan, 868 A.2d 378 (Pa. 2005).
54
Shortly before publication of this Comment, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued an opinion
reversing the Superior Court’s holding in Ferguson v. McKiernan, No. 16 MAP 2005, 2007 WL 4555436
(Pa. Dec. 27, 2007). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the agreement between the sperm donor
and biological mother in Ferguson was enforceable, and that known sperm donors, like anonymous sperm
donors, are protected from child support actions. Id. at *7. The Supreme Court recognized that
Pennsylvania had a long history of protecting anonymous sperm donors from such actions and reasoned
that there was no reason to treat known sperm donors differently. Id. Because there is no similar history of
protecting egg donors (who are generally not anonymous) from child support actions, the effect of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s holding in the context of enforceability of egg donor agreements is unclear.
46
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¶22

These cases are significant in the context of egg donor ART arrangements because
they establish that intended parents may not be able to absolve gamete providers of
support obligations where the donor is known. Egg donor agreements rely on the
assumption that parental responsibilities can be contracted away, and it is safe to assume
that most egg providers would not enter ART arrangements if not for the intended
parents’ willingness to release the donor of parental responsibility. The above
Pennsylvania cases demonstrate, however, that any pre-conception release of a child’s
right to support may be invalidated to the extent that it prejudices the child’s interests.
¶23
Egg donors face an additional risk of being held liable for child support, as
compared to sperm donors, because they are not protected from liability by the 1973
Uniform Parentage Act (UPA or the Act). The Act protects sperm donors by stating that
a “donor of semen provided . . . for use in artificial insemination . . . is treated in law as if
he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.” 55 In the nineteen states that
have adopted the 1973 version of the Act, 56 men who provide sperm for physicianassisted ART, regardless of whether they are known to the intended mother, will not be
held responsible for a child born as a result of their donations. 57 The 1973 version of the
Act contains no similar protection for egg donors.
¶24
Even in states that have not yet adopted the Uniform Parentage Act, child support
liability is a greater risk for egg donors than sperm donors because donations of sperm
are often anonymized before being made available to purchasers. 58 When an intended
parent obtains a sperm specimen from a commercial cryobank, personal information that
could be used to identify and contact the donor is often not available. 59 Anonymity in the
male gamete market distances donors from the recipients and goes a long way to prevent
the kind of litigation discussed above. Anonymity is less common in the female gamete
market. 60 This may be because egg transfer procedures are more successful when eggs

55

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a) (1973).
The states that have enacted the 1973 version of the Uniform Parentage Act in some form are as follows:
Alabama, ALA. CODE §§ 27-16-1 to 26-17-22 (1984); California, CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600-7730 (West
1975); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-4-101 to 19-4-130 (West 1977); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 584-1 to 584-26 (1975); Illinois, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/1 to 45/28 (1984); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 38-1110 to 38-1138 (1985); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. §§ 257.51 to 257.75 (1980); Missouri, MO. REV.
STAT. §§ 210.817 to 210.852 (1987); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-101 to 40-6-105 (1975);
Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 126.011 to 126.371 (1979); New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-38 to 9:1759 (West 1983); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. §§ 40-11-1 to 40-11-23 (1986); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE. ANN.
§§ 3111.01 to 3111.19 (West 1982); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-8-1 to 15-8-27 (1979); Texas,
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.001 to 160.763 (Vernon 2001).
57
Pennsylvania has not yet adopted a version of the Uniform Parentage Act, and the cases discussed above
would likely have developed differently had the Act been controlling. The genetic father in Kesler v.
Weniger, for example, would still be held liable under the Act because his child was conceived through
intercourse rather than through physician-assisted ART. However, the father in Ferguson v. McKiernan
would have fared much better under the Uniform Parentage Act because his donation was physicianassisted, and the fact that he was “known” to the mother would not have affected his classification as a nonliable donor under the Act. Ferguson v. McKiernan, 855 A.2d 121 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004), order rev’d by
Ferguson v. McKiernan, No. 16 MAP 2005, 2007 WL 4555436 (Pa. Dec. 27, 2007).
58
See Mary Lyndon Shanley, Collaboration and Commodification in Assisted Procreation: Reflections on
an Open Market and Anonymous Donation in Human Sperm and Eggs, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 257, 263
(2002) (discussing the rise of anonymization in sperm donations).
59
Id. at 266.
60
See Elaine Gordon, Open Donation: An Intriguing Option, The American Infertility Association of New
York, Oct. 2001, http://www.eggdonor.com/?section=resources&page=opendonation.
56
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are implanted into the recipient within days of extraction rather than frozen and stored for
later use, as is common with sperm specimens. 61
¶25
Thus, egg providers run a risk of litigation aimed at securing child support because:
(1) courts have held that the right to support is a right of the child, and may not be
bargained away by the mother or father; (2) the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act, operative
in nineteen states, offers no protection for egg donors; and (3) egg donors, unlike sperm
donors, rarely remain anonymous. 62
V. RIGHT TO PARENTHOOD
¶26

This section explores issues raised by egg donors who seek to assert parental rights
over their genetic offspring after waiving such rights at the initiation of the assisted
fertility arrangement. Intended parents who enter into third party fertility agreements
with egg providers are typically assured by their ART clinics that their egg providers will
retain no parental rights over the resulting offspring and egg providers are usually
directed to sign consent forms waiving their rights to parenthood. 63 One such consent
form provides: “I will agree to have eggs taken from my ovaries, in order that they may
be donated to another woman” and “[i]t is understood that I waive any right and
relinquish any claim to the donated eggs or any pregnancy or offspring that might result
from them.” 64 While these assurances may provide some peace of mind for intended
parents, there is no guarantee that such waivers will be enforced. In fact, courts have
held that egg providers have standing to assert parentage under the Uniform Parentage
Act and that waivers of parental rights may be irrelevant to the court’s determination of
parenthood.
¶27
The Uniform Parentage Act is a starting point in considering who has standing to
assert parenthood, and how competing claims should be balanced. 65 For example, the
original 1973 Act has a section on artificial insemination, which provides that “the donor
of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a married
woman other than the donor’s wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of
a child thereby conceived.” 66 Without this provision, sperm donors would be considered
“interested parties” under the Act by virtue of their genetic ties and would have standing
to assert parenthood. 67 This provision has an important effect on parentage
determinations in the sperm donor context because, by divesting the donor of standing to
sue, the Act has made it impossible for sperm donors to assert parentage after donating to
a married woman for physician-assisted ART. There is no parallel provision in the 1973
Act for egg donors.
¶28
The 2000 amended version of the Uniform Parentage Act attempts to broaden
regulation of assisted fertility arrangements and, unlike the 1973 Act, includes a
61
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provision applicable to egg donors. 68 Section 702 of the Act provides: “A donor is not a
parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.” 69 “Donor” is defined as
someone who produces either an egg or sperm used for assisted reproduction, which is
defined as any “method for causing pregnancy other than sexual intercourse.” 70 The term
donor does not include “a husband who provides sperm, or a wife who provides eggs, to
be used for assisted reproduction by the wife; or . . . a woman who gives birth to a child
by means of assisted reproduction,” except if that woman is a gestational surrogate. 71 By
referring to gamete donors in a general sense, this provision controls parentage
determinations in both egg donor and sperm donor ART arrangements. Because the 1973
sperm donor provision has been held to divest sperm donors of standing to assert
parentage, 72 one might reasonably assume that the 2000 provision similarly divests egg
donors of standing to assert parentage. Courts in the six states that have adopted the 2000
Act have yet to interpret the new donor provision, however, and the answer to this
question of interpretation remains unknown. 73
¶29
The evolution of judicial decisionmaking in this area demonstrates the uncertainty
that parties may face when they seek judicial resolution of their parental disputes. The
leading case in the area of parental assignment in ART arrangements is Johnson v.
Calvert, decided by the Supreme Court of California in 1993. 74 The holding in this case
is said to have established the “intention test” for deciding parental disputes between a
genetic mother and a gestational surrogate. The dispute began when Anna Johnson, who
had agreed to act as a gestational carrier for the Calverts, changed her mind towards the
end of the pregnancy and refused to relinquish custody of the baby. 75 The Calverts
sought a declaration of parentage under the Uniform Parentage Act. 76 The court
determined that the Uniform Parentage Act allows women to establish a mother-child
relationship through evidence of giving birth to the child or evidence of genetic ties to the
child. 77 Thus, both women were held to have colorable claims to parentage because Ms.
Johnson had given birth to the child and Ms. Calvert was the genetic mother of the
child. 78
¶30
The court then held that when two means of establishing parentage under the Act
do not coincide in one woman, the woman who “intended to bring about the birth of the
child that she intended to raise as her own” is the mother of the child under California
68
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law. 79 The court then examined the parties’ intentions as manifested in the ART
agreement, and found that it was the genetic mother, Mrs. Calvert, who “from the outset
intended to be the child’s mother.” 80 Thus, after recognizing that each woman had a
colorable claim to parenthood, the court ruled in favor of the genetic mother and assigned
full parental rights to the Calverts. 81
¶31
Although Johnson v. Calvert did not deal directly with a dispute between intended
parents and an egg donor, its holding has two important implications for egg donor
arrangements. First, the Johnson holding establishes that egg donors, unlike sperm
donors, have standing to bring actions to determine parentage under the Uniform
Parentage Act. They are considered “interested parties” for the purpose of assigning
parenthood in third party fertility arrangements. This is because the Act recognizes
genetic consanguinity as a means of establishing father-child relationships, and then
prescribes that “insofar as practicable, the provisions of the Act applicable to the father
and child relationship” apply to determinations of a mother and child relationship as
well. 82 Thus, just as Section Three provides that “a natural mother may be established by
proof of her having given birth to the child,” genetic consanguinity was also held to be a
means of determining a child’s natural mother. 83 Second, the Johnson holding
establishes that where competing biological claims to parenthood exist as a result of an
ART arrangement and either woman would be recognized as a mother under the Uniform
Parentage Act, the intent of the parties as manifested in the initial agreement will serve as
the tiebreaker.
¶32
The Johnson intention test was further developed in the case of K.M. v. E.G. 84 In
that case, appellant K.M.’s eggs were extracted, fertilized in vitro, and implanted into the
womb of her lesbian partner, E.G., who carried the pregnancy to term. 85 The couple
agreed that only E.G. would be the parent of the resulting offspring, but after twin girls
were born, both women took on parenting responsibilities. 86 The women separated five
years later, and K.M. filed a petition to establish her parental relationship with the
children. 87 In response, E.G. filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that
K.M. lacked standing to assert parentage. 88
¶33
The court of appeals held that although both women had standing to bring action to
determine parentage under the Uniform Parentage Act,89 the egg donor consent forms
signed by K.M. indicated that she had waived her parental rights. 90 The court concluded
that K.M. did not qualify as a parent under the Uniform Parentage Act, despite her
79
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genetic ties to the children, because the parties intended that only E.G. would have
parental status over the children when they entered into the initial fertility agreement. 91
Further, the court rejected the notion that both women could be recognized as natural
mothers because the Johnson holding established that California law recognizes only one
natural mother for any child. 92
¶34
This holding was a major advancement for the Johnson intention test and would
have contributed significantly to predictable enforcement of the third party fertility
agreements. However, the Supreme Court of California reversed the decision in 2004. 93
While the Supreme Court agreed that K.M. had “explicitly donated her ovum under a
clear written agreement by which she relinquished any claim to offspring born of her
donation,” the court stated that K.M.’s waiver had no effect on its determination of
parentage and ruled that both lesbian partners were parents of the twin girls. 94 The court
reasoned that the holding in Johnson, that California law recognizes only one natural
mother, did not preclude the court from determining that a child has two parents, “both of
whom are women.” 95 Also, the court found it significant that in this case, unlike
Johnson, the two women’s claims of parentage were not mutually exclusive. The court
wrote, “K.M. does not claim to be the twins’ mother instead of E.G., but in addition to
E.G.,” and opined that the “Johnson intent test does not apply when there is no ‘tie’ to
break.” 96 Thus, the majority carved out an exception to the Johnson intention test for egg
donors who have “supplied . . . ova to impregnate [a] lesbian partner in order to produce
children who would be raised in their joint home,” ruling that the egg provider is a parent
of the resulting children, despite any earlier manifestations of her intent not to be a
parent. 97
¶35
As the dissenting opinion by Judge Werdagar pointed out, the majority’s rejection
of the intention test and willingness to void a third party fertility agreement is
problematic. Judge Werdagar wrote that the intention test established in Johnson was
significant because it allowed parties to assisted fertility agreements “to create, before
conception, settled and enforceable expectations about who would and would not become
parents.” 98 By undermining the predictive function of the Johnson intention test, the
Supreme Court of California’s decision in K.M. v. E.G. will contribute to the level of
uncertainty in egg provider arrangements. Although the majority’s opinion is narrow in
the sense that it foregoes the Johnson intention test only where there is an understanding
that the child is to be raised in the parties’ “joint home,” the opinion threatens the
enforceability of all egg donor contracts because of its willingness to disregard the
intention test and its emphasis on the genetic relationship between the egg donor and the
child. Even though the majority did not dispute the fact that K.G. manifested her
intention to waive parenthood, they still found in her favor, reasoning that her “claim to
be the twins’ mother because the twins were produced from her ova is equal to, and arose
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at the same time as, E.G.’s claim to be the twins’ mother because she gave birth to
them.” 99
¶36
In sum, case law in the area of egg provider parental assertion suggests that consent
forms stripping donors of their parental rights are far from airtight. As a result of their
genetic relationship to their children, egg providers have standing to assert parenthood
under the Uniform Parentage Act. Also, as seen in K.M. v. E.G., courts may be willing to
hold that parental waiver consent forms signed by egg providers are irrelevant to their
determination of parenthood.
VI. RIGHT TO PURSUE CONTRACT CLAIMS AGAINST INTENDED PARENTS AND FERTILITY
CLINICS FOR MISUSE OF EGGS
¶37

The previous section explored cases in which egg providers seek to prevent the
enforcement of certain provisions in their donor contracts. This section examines an
alternate situation. What if an egg donor feels she has been deprived of the benefit of her
bargain and seeks judicial enforcement of an egg donor contract? This section explores
three basic scenarios: unconsented transfer of eggs, unconsented destruction of eggs, and
misuse of eggs in biomedical research.
¶38
When egg donors are asked to explain their interest in participating in third party
fertility arrangements, it is common for them to say that they want to help an infertile
couple achieve parenthood. 100 However, there is no guarantee that the provider’s eggs
will be used to that end. Between the times eggs are harvested and a child is born, one or
more parties to the ART arrangement may decide they no longer want to carry or raise a
child. Thus, a disagreement might arise between a party who wants a way out of the
ART arrangement and parties who want to continue with an ART arrangement until a
child is born.
¶39
The Supreme Court of Washington faced such a dispute in Litowitz v. Litowitz. 101
This case involved an agreement between an infertile married couple (the wife had
undergone a hysterectomy) and an egg donor. 102 Pursuant to their agreement, five eggs
were extracted from the egg donor and fertilized in vitro with the husband’s sperm. 103
Three of these fertilized eggs, or preembryos, were then implanted in a gestational
surrogate, resulting in the birth of a girl. 104 The other two preembryos were cryogenically
preserved. 105 The couple then divorced and was unable to agree as to the disposition of
the preserved preembryos. 106 The wife wanted to have the preembryos thawed and
implanted into a gestational surrogate so that she might have another child. 107 The
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husband, however, did not want another child and wanted instead to donate the remaining
preembryos to another “adoptive” couple. 108
Although the egg donor was not a party to the litigation, the court was moved to
consider her role because the Litowitz’s egg donor contract required written permission
from the egg donor before the eggs could be transferred to another couple according to
the father’s wishes. 109 The court concluded that this provision conferred no rights on the
egg donor in the present conflict because “the eggs no longer existed as they were
identified in the egg donor contract as they were later fertilized with Respondent’s sperm
and their character was then changed to preembryos.” 110 Thus, the egg donor’s right to
protect her eggs from being transferred to unknown intended parents dissolved at the
moment they were fertilized. This holding is significant because it greatly diminishes an
egg donor’s ability to prevent unwanted transfer of genetic material by requiring her
consent, because an opposing party may simply avoid consent requirements by fertilizing
the egg.
Also, even if such contractual consent requirements were broadened to require
consent of the egg donor before an egg or a resulting embryo is transferred to another
party, egg donors would still have little hope of securing the originally intended use of
their eggs. While a donor could prevent unwanted transfer by refusing consent, she could
not ensure that her eggs are used to create a child according to the parties’ original intent
because intended parents retain a right not to procreate.
In Litowitz v. Litowitz, the Supreme Court of Washington held that, even though the
husband had expressed his intention to become a parent in the egg donor contract, he was
not bound by that contract to become a parent. 111 When enforcement of a contract to
create a child would impair an intended parent’s constitutional right not to procreate,
courts will typically refuse enforcement. 112 Thus, even if an intended mother and egg
donor want preembryos to be gestated, requiring no further contribution from the father, a
court will grant the father’s wish to destroy or transfer the embryos. The father retains
his constitutional right not to procreate, which outweighs the wife’s wishes to
procreate. 113 Thus, the Litowitz court, faced with a husband and wife who could not agree
about the disposition of their preembryos following divorce, held that the husband was
not bound by the egg donor contract because he retained his right not to procreate even
after the eggs were fertilized with his sperm. 114
Similar reasoning was applied by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in A.Z. v.
B.Z. 115 Divorced litigants called on the court to resolve a disagreement regarding the
disposition of frozen preembryos. 116 The wife wanted the preembryos released to her for
implantation so that she might have another child, while the husband sought to enjoin her
use of the preembryos. 117 In this case, the wife relied on a consent form signed by her ex108
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husband prior to the IVF procedure resulting in the disputed preembryos. The consent
form stated if the parties were to separate, “both [parties] agree to have the embryo(s) . . .
returned to the wife for implantation.” 118 The court held that the consent form was legally
insufficient for several reasons and that, even if these insufficiencies were resolved, the
court would refuse to enforce any agreement that compelled an IVF participant to
become a parent against his wishes.119 “Forced procreation,” the court wrote, “is not an
area amenable to judicial enforcement.” 120 Therefore, even if all parties manifest their
intent to create a child, an egg donor is unable to enforce these provisions because
intended parents retain a right not to procreate until the embryos are implanted into a
carrier.
¶44
Even after a donor’s eggs are fertilized and implanted for gestation, she is unable to
ensure that her contribution will result in the birth of a child, because the woman carrying
the pregnancy, whether intended mother or gestational carrier, retains the right to
terminate the pregnancy even if she has previously expressed her intent to carry the fetus
to term. Although courts have yet to face the question directly, other case law suggests
that egg donors will be left with little relief if another woman terminates a pregnancy that
relied on the egg donor’s contribution.
¶45
In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, the Supreme Court
considered a challenge to a Missouri abortion statute that required spousal consent before
a married woman could obtain an abortion. 121 The Court declared the provision
unconstitutional, reasoning in part that a husband’s clear interest in the birth of his child
is outweighed by a woman’s interest in non-procreation if she chooses to terminate the
pregnancy. 122 The Court stated: “Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically bears the
child and who is more directly and immediately affected by pregnancy, as between the
two, the balance weighs in her favor.” 123 Thus, when parties disagree about whether to
carry a pregnancy to term, the party who gestates the embryo is the ultimate decision
maker, even if her decision opposes the wishes of a genetic contributor.
¶46
This rule has been further developed in cases involving disputes between intended
parents and surrogates. For example, in Matter of Baby M, the Superior Court of New
Jersey considered a contract between intended parents and a surrogate that included a
clause prohibiting the surrogate from obtaining an abortion without the intended father’s
consent. 124 The court declared this provision void and unenforceable. It stated:
After conception, only the surrogate shall have the right, to the exclusion
of the sperm donor, to decide whether to abort the fetus. . . . Roe [v. Wade]
establishes and recognizes the unique and singular quality of woman.
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That only woman has the constitutionally protected right to determine the
manner in which her body and person shall be used. 125
¶47

Therefore, although many egg donors are apparently induced by the prospect of
effectuating the birth of a child, they have little likelihood of success in bringing contract
claims against either intended parents or gestational carriers for transferring or destroying
their eggs or terminating a resulting pregnancy.
¶48
Egg donors might also seek enforcement of contractual provisions against intended
parents or fertility clinics in the event of misuse of donor eggs. Cryogenically preserved
embryos are routinely used for medical research, and the development of biomedical
products often depends on the availability of human tissue like gametes and embryos. 126
Because scientific advancements in these areas can be extremely profitable, the issue of
ownership of the body materials involved becomes pressing. 127 If a woman’s eggs are
used without her consent in the development of a commercially successful biomedical
product, can she sue for a share of the profits? Does she maintain a property interest in
her eggs once they are removed from her body? Or is it improper for eggs to be
considered property at all?
¶49
In the case of Moore v. Regents of the University of California, the California
Supreme Court held that a patient does not retain a property interest in material extracted
from his body. 128 The Plaintiff in Moore was a patient at UCLA medical center.129
During the course of his treatment for hairy-cell leukemia, significant amounts of his
blood, blood serum, skin, and bone marrow were removed. 130 Moore consented to each
of these removals because he was informed that they were necessary to advance his
treatment or prolong the spread of his disease. 131 Then, two years after Moore’s first visit
to the Medical Center, his attending physician established a cell line from Moore’s body
material, which was later patented by the Regents of the University of California. 132
Moore’s physician and the University then entered into a commercial agreement with
Genetics Institute in which the University agreed to provide exclusive access to their
materials and research in exchange for 75,000 shares of common stock and at least
$330,000 over three years. 133
¶50
Moore sued under thirteen separate causes of action. 134 In a controversial decision,
the Supreme Court of California held that while the plaintiff’s rights were protected by
the doctrine of informed consent, he could not bring a conversion claim against the
defendants because he did not maintain a proprietary interest in his body material after it
was removed. 135 Thus, while Moore could sue his physician for failing to disclose a
125
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financial interest in the extraction of his body material, Moore could not sue for a share
of the cell line profits because the court was unwilling to recognize that Moore had a title
to his own bodily material once it was extracted from his body. In dissent, Justice Mosk
wrote of the majority’s holding the position that “plaintiff cannot own his tissue, but that
[the defendants] can, is fraught with irony.” 136
¶51
In the egg donor context, Moore seems to establish that women do not maintain a
proprietary interest in their eggs once they are harvested, unless there is an agreement
otherwise. Thus, if a woman’s eggs are donated in an ART arrangement and are then
sold or donated for commercially successful research, the woman’s only avenue for relief
is through the doctrine of informed consent. 137 While fertility clinics have a duty to
disclose any auxiliary financial interest in the harvesting of a woman’s eggs, if the eggs
are then used as raw material in the development of profitable biomedical products, the
donor can not bring an action for conversion.
¶52
The Moore holding was examined in the context of gamete transfer three years later
in Hecht v. Superior Court, which involved a dispute over the disposition of
cryogenically preserved sperm. 138 Over a period of time, William Kane deposited fifteen
vials of his sperm for cryopreservation at a sperm bank. 139 He then took his own life,
leaving a will outlining his intent to become a father posthumously. 140 He directed that
the sperm be released to his long-term girlfriend, Deborah Hecht, for fertilization so that
she might bear his genetic child. 141 Kane’s two adult children from a previous marriage
opposed the release of their father’s sperm, and the court was called on to decide, as a
threshold matter, whether Kane’s sperm was “property” within the probate court’s
jurisdiction. 142 Kane’s adult children argued that their late father’s bodily material was
not property under the Moore rationale and that the probate court was, therefore, without
jurisdiction to decide the disposition of the sperm. 143 The court disagreed and found that
the sperm was a sui generis form of property and that the decedent had an interest in his
sperm, therefore falling within a broad definition of property. 144 The court also
distinguished gametes from other body parts, reasoning that gametes are entitled to
“special respect” because of their potential for human life. 145
¶53
The Hecht decision illustrates that courts still suffer from a lack of guiding
principles when it comes to recognizing property rights in the human body. Even in the
state of California, where the Moore court expressed an unwillingness to recognize a
plaintiff’s property right in his own excised cells, the law is unsettled. The debate over
the existence or extent of a property interest in one’s body is likely to intensify in the
gamete context as the growing frequency of gamete transfer provides growing
136
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opportunities for abuse. The Hecht decision also illustrates that a separate and distinct
paradigm may be needed to address gamete ownership. The court indicated that in the
gamete context, little guidance can be gained from cases involving the disposition of
other bodily materials, like transplantable organs, pituitary glands, or corneal tissue,
because, unlike sperm and eggs, they do not hold the potential for human life.
¶54
In sum, egg providers have little chance of protecting their eggs from misuse
following extraction. Although egg providers are commonly assured that their eggs will
be used to effectuate pregnancy, eggs may be destroyed at any stage before implantation.
Even after implantation, the pregnancy carrier maintains a right to terminate the
pregnancy. Also, although the doctrine of informed consent requires fertility clinics to
disclose any financial interest in a provider’s eggs, if eggs are extracted for use in
biomedical research without the provider’s consent, the provider cannot maintain an
action for conversion to share in the profits of the research.
VII.

CONCLUSION

¶55

Advances in reproductive technology will continue to push American courts to
define the boundaries of reproductive choice. As a result, judges will be called on to
weigh important conflicting interests, such as the interest in protecting procreative
freedom and the interest in preserving potential life. This paper has attempted to
elucidate some of these conflicts in the context of egg donor ART arrangements. As
described above, people who are considering entering into an egg donor fertility
arrangement, either as intended parents or as egg providers, need to be aware of the legal
uncertainty surrounding their agreements.
¶56
First, intended parents should understand that their egg provider will not be a legal
stranger to a child born as a result of her genetic contribution. Contractual provisions
requiring egg donors to relinquish all parental rights to their genetic children have not
been endorsed by American courts. Second, egg donors should be aware that contractual
provisions, in which intended parents assume financial responsibility for the resulting
child, are likely unenforceable. This is because courts have held that the right to support
may not be bargained away before a child’s conception. Finally, egg donors should be
aware that their eggs may be transferred or destroyed without their consent.
¶57
Because legislative bodies have been slow to address public policy concerns raised
by egg transfers, parties to egg donor ART arrangements must rely on the judiciary when
their agreements go sour. Legal uncertainties surrounding egg transfers will only become
more problematic as the procedure gains popularity. In the past ten years, egg donor
ART arrangements have become more mainstream, and donated eggs were used in three
times as many ART arrangements last year than in 1996. 146 As more procreative
decisions rely on the availability of egg transfer, courts should strive for consistency and
predictability in the enforcement of egg donor contracts.
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